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Post-traumatic stress disorder: the legal view
by Sandeep Savla
On researching the subject of post- 
traumatic stress disorder ('PTSD') as a 
defence in criminal proceedings, the 
dearth of published material seemed 
apparent. Despite this, I will suggest in 
this short article that PTSD may be used 
as a potent criminal defence. More 
specifically, this article will consider how 
the PTSD defence can be cogently argued 
before the criminal courts and, for that 
purpose, the manner in which medical 
experts should be asked to structure their 
reports.
When arguing PTSD as a defence in 
criminal proceedings, the defence has to 
be fitted into the structure of the 
criminal law as it presently exists. 
Therefore, PTSD has to be brought
' o
within the three defences of insanity, 
diminished responsibility' or automatism. 
The focus of this article is non-insane 
automatism, but it is as well to consider 
all three defences.
INSANITY
The basis of the insanity defence is to 
be found in the M'Naghten Rules 
((1843) 10 Cl & F 200). The test for 
insanity arising from the M'Naghten 
Rules may be summarised as follows.
(1) Everyone is presumed sane unless 
proved otherwise.
(2) It is a defence to a criminal 
prosecution for the accused to show 
that he or she suffered from a defect
of reason due to a disease of the 
mind. The defendant must show 
that he or she did not know the 
nature or quality- of the act, or did 
not know that what he or she was 
doing was wrong.
The phrase 'disease of the mind' refers 
to something 'internal' and, according to 
the House of Lords case of R v Sullivan 
[1984] AC 156, it must affect the 
faculties of reason, memory and 
understanding. The insanity defence is 
not really applicable to PTSD because the 
case of R v Quick [1973] QB 910 held that 
the application of an external factor, such 
as violence, would not constitute a 
disease of the mind. A defendant who 
suffered from a traumatic event would be 
relying on an external cause and 




Section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 
reduces the offence of murder to 
manslaughter if, at the time of the 
offence, the defendant was suffering from 
an abnormality of mind. That 
abnormality of mind must have 
substantially impaired his or her 
responsibility' for the killing. Strictly 
speaking, medical experts should confine 
themselves to the first part of s. 2: in 
other words, they should consider 
whether the defendant was suffering 
from an abnormality of mind.
Most psychiatrists see abnormality' of 
mind as being any mental state that meets 
current recognised diagnostic criteria, for 
instance the criteria in the fourth edition 
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(DSM IV) (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994). However, what we 
are actually concerned with is the legal 
definition of abnormality of mind and, 
according to R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396, 
that equates to a state of mind so 
different from that of an ordinary person 
that the reasonable person would term it 
absurd.
PTSD within the context of 
diminished responsibility' has taken on 
renewed importance in cases of battered 
women who have killed their husbands. 
In these cases, the triggering event for the 
commission of the act may be quite 
minor, so that provocation could not be 
argued. However, it may be possible to 
show that a woman who has been 
exposed to violence 'over time' is 
suffering from PTSD, so as to rely on the 
diminished responsibility defence.
AUTOMATISM
This brings me to the main focus of the 
present article. 'Automatism' refers to an 
act that is beyond a person's control 
because there is no direction from the 
mind. Automatism has been divided by 
the court, in R v Kemp [1957] QB 399, 
into sane and insane automatism and this 
approach was approved in Bratty v AG for 
NI [1963] AC 386. Automatism that is 
derived from an external force is deemed 
to be sane and the defence may then be 
put before the jury The defence results 
in a complete acquittal for the defendant. 
By contrast, where there is an internal 
cause, this is the legal equivalent of 
insanity (see above).
While most mental states have an 
internal cause, PTSD is derived from an 
external trauma. PTSD as a defence is 
therefore most likely to succeed when 
argued under the head of 'non-insane 
automatism'. Here the accused only 
bears the burden of adducing evidenceo
and the burden of disproving non-insane 
automatism is then borne by the Crown.
The significance of PTSD as a possible 
defence first appears in the case of R v T 
[1990] Crim LR 256, decided at 
Snaresbrook Crown Court by Southan J. 
T was charged with robbery and assaulto J
occasioning actual bodily harm. She had 
injured a victim with a Stanley knife after 
a disagreement. On arrest, she was 
passive and indifferent, and in interview 
she could only recollect some events. T 
was examined by a doctor in Holloway 
Prison seven days later and he found that
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her hymen had been ruptured and was 
bleeding. T complained that she had 
been raped three days prior to the arrest. 
T was then examined on a number of 
occasions by a psychiatrist, who 
diagnosed PTSD to the extent that she 
was in a dissociative state at the time that 
she had committed the offence.
Southan J held that rape could have an 
appalling effect on any young woman,
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however well balanced she normally was. 
PTSD involving a normal person in an act 
of violence was not to be considered a 
disease of the mind (within the M'Naghten 
Rules), even if there was a delay before the 
dissociation manifested itself.
This case may be contrasted with the 
Canadian case of R v Rabey (1978) 79 
DLR (3d) 414. In that case, the defence 
of non-insane automatism was not 
accepted in respect of the psychological 
blow caused by the break-up of a 
relationship with a girlfriend. The 
Ontario Court of Appeal rejected this 
psychological blow as one of the ordinary 
stresses and disappointments of life (at 
435). It is clear, therefore, that the 
defence of PTSD will be approached with 
some caution and that the triggering
OO O
event for the PTSD must have a 
traumatic effect on a normally well- 
balanced person.
Another case of PTSD being used as a 
defence by arguing non-insane 
automatism may be found in the 
literature: Wright et al report the case of 
a police officer who raised the PTSD 
defence before a jury by arguing non- 
insane automatism (see 'Automatism 
revisited: post-traumatic automatism as a 
defence to a serious criminal charge' 
(1995) 35 Med Sci Law 327). The police 
officer was hit on the face by a man he 
was arresting and was rendered 
unconscious. When he recovered he hit 
the handcuffed man with his truncheon. 
In a case where a conviction seemed a 
foregone conclusion, psychiatric evidence 
was obtained about three traumatic 
events that the defendant had suffered:
(1) The defendant had been in the Royal 
Navy for 12 years and in 1965 he 
was caught by a booby trap in Malaya 
and rendered unconscious.
(2) The defendant had been a passenger 
in a train crash in 1968, when three 
people had been killed in his 
compartment.
(3) Finally, in 1987 the defendant had 
suffered a whiplash injury in a car 
accident.
There was no past history of mental 
disorder. In interview, the police officer 
said that, when he recovered from being 
hit in the face, he saw bright lights and
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stars and had a dazed feeling. The 
casualty officer who saw the police officer 
recorded in his notes that the police 
officer seemed very taken aback by the 
fact that he had been struck in the face. 
The psychiatric evidence stated that the 
police officer had been suffering from a 
temporary injury to the brain, which 
brought on post-traumatic amnesia. 
Evidence was given by witnesses at the 
trial as to the fact that the police officer 
had been knocked out for four to five 
minutes and the police officer himself 
had no memory of the act. This 
seemingly 'open and shut case' led to two 
hung juries and, in this writers 
submission, shows the potential of the 
PTSD defence.
ROLES OF SOLICITOR AND 
PSYCHIATRIST
These two cases suggest an important 
way forward in the assertion of the PTSD 
defence. It is clear that the opinion of the 
expert psychiatrist is important. The 
opinion of the expert is admissible to 
furnish the court with scientific 
information which is likely to be outside 
the experience of the judge and jury (see 
R v Turner [1975] QB 854). The rule is 
that the expert is prohibited from giving 
his or her opinion on the ultimate issue: 
the job of the psychiatrist, then, is to 
educate the judge and jury about PTSD. 
In seeking to do this, it is advisable that 
the following approach be followed:
(1) The psychiatrist should review the 
pre-traumatic state in detail and 
form a view on the traumatic event 
itself. He or she should contrast the 
pre-traumatic status and post- 
traumatic behaviour of the 
defendant.
(2) Both cases above show that the 
defendant's account alone will not 
be sufficient. There should be 
interviews with independent 
persons to strengthen the 
connection between the traumatic 
event and the behaviour relating to 
the alleged offence.
(3) The diagnosis should be made by the 
psychiatrist on the basis of a detailed 
account of the symptoms and, if 
possible, with reference to DSM IV
(4) It is important to recognise that 
many people survive extraordinary 
trauma, so the psychiatrist should 
link the particular trauma to the 
commission of the particular act that 
constitutes the crime (see Ashtead, 
'PTSD and the Criminal Law' in 
PTSD: Explaining, Understanding, 
Treating (Mole Conferences, 
November 1997)).
In R v T there was independent 
evidence of a physical nature to indicate 
the traumatic event and, in the 
subsequent case, the witnesses and the 
casualty officer provide independent 
corroborative evidence.
It would appear, then, that when 
solicitors arc faced with a defendant who 
is disorientated at the time of the 
commission of the offence, it may be 
possible to obtain psychiatric evidence to 
link the commission of the crime with a 
previous traumatic event.
OVERCOMING OBJECTIONS
The Law Commission, in its report 
dealing with PTSD in the civil context,
O
identified three possible difficulties (see 
Law Commission, 'Liability for 
Psychiatric Illness', Consultation Paper 
No. 137, HMSO 1995, p. 51-57).
First, judges may be wary of flooding 
courts with PTSD defences. Doctors are 
increasingly willing to support PTSD 
claims and the concept of PTSD seems to 
be expanding. Acute stress disorder', for 
instance, is new to DSM IV and was 
added to describe acute reactions to 
extreme stress. It has also been suggested 
that there is evidence to support the 
existence of a more complex stress 
reaction occurring in victims of 
prolonged, repeated and inter-personal 
violence and victimisation. However, all 
the legitimate diagnoses of psychiatric 
conditions must today meet the 
diagnostic criteria which are contained in 
the classificatory system in DSM IV Any 
discrepancy between the particular 
diagnosis and the classificatory systems 
can be probed in cross-examination, as 
can a failure to rule out alternative
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The second possible objection is 
fraudulent and exaggerated claims. It is 
argued that claimants may be able to fake 
the symptoms of a psychiatric illness and 
that they may be able to exploit 
legitimate differences of opinion within 
the medical profession. However, 
although no physical tests exist with 
which to ascertain an assertion of PTSD, 
there are a number of psychological tests. 
These psychological tests may help to 
distinguish long-standing character 
problems and dysfunctions from illness 
or injury of a sudden onset. The 
psychological tests are objective and given 
by computer and these tests are then 
complemented by clinical evaluation and 
corroborative interviews with family 
members.
The third and final objection is one of 
conflicting medical opinions. There is 
disagreement among mental healtho o
professionals concerning the presence or 
absence of a mental disorder following 
trauma. It is clear that there is a fluidity
of psychiatric thinking here and there 
may be a judicial perception that mental 
health professionals may agree to a legally 
predetermined position. Nonetheless, 
there is no reason why courts cannot 
weigh evidence here as in other cases.
CONCLUSION
It would seem that there is no reason 
why the courts should not accept the 
defence of PTSD in criminal 
proceedings. What is required is a careful 
strategy to present expert evidence. 
Expert evidence must be supported with 
independent corroborative interviews 
from family members to establish the 
pre-traumatic status, evidence from 
witnesses who were present at the scene 
of the crime and evidence from 
independent witnesses, including those 
who may have examined the defendant 
shortlv after the commission of the 
crime. While all these types of evidence 
may not be present, the more evidence 
that can be found the stronger the
defence. Although the scope of the 
defence is not clear, what does appear 
from the cases discussed above is that 
PTSD put forward as 'non-insane 
automatism' may be more readily 
available than is presently thought. @
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